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Setting for the dialogue: Mantu meets Nisha in the 
realms of eternity where in all knowledge and truth make 
themselves manifest and discuss the philosophical questions 
of truth and knowledge. Mantu starts the dialogue on the 
question of "What is knowledge?" and after some length of 
discussion they arrive at an understanding of its parts. 
I, Eternity, witnessed the discussion and I now re-
late it to mankind for their benefit and instruction. 
Mantu: · Greetings Nisha my companion. It is good to meet 
you again in the realms of Eternity. 
Nisha: Salutations to you also my friend. Eternity our 
father is good to us. He has seen fit within himself to 
make all things manifest to us, that we may know them. 
Man tu: :aut, Oh my friend, what is knowledge? H0 w do 
we see into the eternities and obtain it unto ourselves? 
Nisha: That is a very good question. It would seem to 
me that when we talk of knowledge we mean we have an aware-
ness of facts, truths, and principles and that this aware-
ness is understanding. 
Mantu: Do you mean that knowledge is equivalent to under-
standing instead of a process by which we obtain and in the 
end attain it. 
Nisha: Yes I mean that. 
Mantu: Thou hast said rightly for the truth of this makes 
itself maifest to me intuitively and therefore can not be 
doubted. 
Nisha: It can not be doubted of course my friend. That 
which is always true never can. That which is never true 
can not be doubted either. Whatsoever is contingent can 
thou gh . 
Mantu: You understand my thoughts. They have made them-
selves manifest to you. That which is always true makes 
itself manifest and when we become aware of it we have 
knowledge. You said part of knowledge is an awareness of 
facts. What do you mean by this my friend Nisha. 
Nisha: An awareness of facts is simply an awareness of 
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the states of affairs entailed in actuality and possibility. 
In actuality states of affai rs are contingent but in reality 
or all possibility they are al ways true, never true and 
contingent. 
Mantu: What do you mean by always true? 
Nisha: 
ing. 
I mean that which is tantologous or self evidenc-
Mant u: What do you mean by never true? 
Nis ha: I mean that which is contradictory or self refuting. 
Man tu: But are not contradictions impossible? How then 
can states of affairs be contradictory in all reality or 
possibility? 
Nisha: It would seem that all possibility would have to 
be equal with all actuality for this to be the case. 
Man tu: I don't see how that changes it any. 
Nisha: In actuality things are contingent. In reality they 
3 
are necessary. In orde r for contradictions to be possible 
the states of affairs which ma~e them impossible would have 
to be non actual and non possible. 
Mantu: Do you think such a possibility exists? 
Nisha: I am not sure let's return to this later. 
Mant u: May we say that knowledge is an awareness of that 
which is always true, never true, and/or contingent in 
possibility and/or actuality. 
Nisha : Yes we may. 
Mantu: You also said that knowledge is an awareness of 
truths. What do you mean by truths? 
Nisha : By truths I mean those things which correspond 
with the fa cts having truth values. 
Mantu: But my friend you said facts may be contradictory 
can truths be contradictory? 
Nisha: f hey can, relatively to different spheres of under-
standing. If we take two different opposin g spheres of truth 
and try to fuse these spheres they will be contradictory. How-
ever both will be true relatively. 
Man tu : Could both be true absolu te ly? 
Nisha: I think not. 
Man tu: 
be true? 
Nisha: 
Man tu: 
If they were both true absolutely would all things 
I think so. 
Wherefore if we can find two relative truths that 
when conjoined are both true at the same time absolutely in 
a new sphere of truth which joins their relative spheres 
into one contradictory absolutely true whole, all things 
would be true. Do you think such a possibility exists? 
Nisha: I think not but if it did all things would be 
possible and all possibility would be equal with actuality. 
Mantu: That would prove to be an interesting world my 
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friend, lets put aside this for awhile and go back to what 
we were discussing earlier. Nisha from what we have just 
said may truths be tautologous contradictory, and contingent 
at least relatively? 
Nisha: Yes they could, if we were to compare different 
sph eres of truth or worlds one with another. 
Mantu: May we then assume that knowledge is an awareness 
of truths and that an awareness of truths is also an aware-
ness of the taut ologo us, the contradictory, and the contingent? 
Nisha: That we may. 
Mantu : May we then assume that the awareness of facts and 
truths relative to their sphere is the same thing? 
Nisha: That we may also. 
Man tu: You also stated my friend that knowledge is an 
awareness of principles. What do you mean by that, Nisha? 
Nisha: I mean that principles are those things which 
manifest unto us how different worlds or spheres of truth 
are related. 
Mantu: My friend it would seem to me that if two spheres 
were related they could be either contingent on each other 
or non contigent on each other. 
Nisha: 
Mantu? 
Man tu: 
5 
What do you mean by non contingent on each other 
Only that they contradict each other and are there-
fore independent of each other causally and logically. 
Nisha: My friend it would seem that once again we have 
arrived at the belief that knowledge is a awareness of the 
contradictory, and the contingent. I would add again the 
tautologous to this because when we are aware that a harmony 
exists between all the worlds in a certain point we also have 
an awareness of the tautologous pyinciples. Knowledge it 
seems breaks down to an awareness of the tautologous, the 
contradictory, and the contingent. 
Man tu: You are ri ght my friend. Facts, principles, and 
truths, all become different names for the sa~e things. It 
would seem to me Nisha that knowledge is understanding these 
three things and where they define the limits between spheres 
of truth relatively and where no limits exist absolutely. 
Knowledge it seems would also be an understanding of the 
difference between the relative and the absolute. Do you 
agree my friend'? 
Nisha : I do. Mantu it seems to me that contradictions 
show the differences separating the spheres and that contingen-
ci es malce up the spheres and that tautologies unify the spheres. 
Mantu: Very good that is my understanding also my friend. 
But what would this tell us about the necessary and the contin-
gent? 
Nisha: I believe that it would tell us that necessity 
hold up the spheres and separates them and contingency 
constitutes the difference within each sphere. 
Mantu: How would necessity separate the spheres Nisha? 
Nisha: Contradictions are necessary separations due 
to the laws of logic. Separation becomes necessary be-
cause of the law of Contradiction without a separation 
contradictions would be true absolutely. 
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Mantu: Very good, Nisha but what are all the contradictions 
based upon? 
Nisha: It would seem to me that the contradictions re-
sult from the differences in the contingencies from sphere 
to sphere. When we try to harmonize two spheres where 
harmony is impossible due to the divergent contingencies 
within them. 
Mantu: But Nisha what gives the contingencies in the 
spheres their truth values? 
Nisha: Deductive relations. 
Man tu: Can you conduct a sound deduction without at least 
one "true" premise? 
Nisha: No. 
Man tu: From this it follows necessarily that there must 
be a true premise or "if you will" a tautology in the sphere 
in order to derive the truth values of the contingencies. 
Thus it would follow that all contingencies must ultimately be 
based upon the tautologies underlying the spheres where then, 
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Nisha , can there appear contradictions from deductions of 
the contin ge nt relations based upon the necessary tautologies 
that are the same and are inherent to all spheres of relative 
truths? 
Nisha: 
Man tu: 
It would seem that contradiction s are impossible. 
Nisha, have we not overlooked the fact that contra-
dictions as well as tautologies are necessary truths due to 
their necessary truth value? 
Nish a: Tha t we have. It would follow from that, that 
contradictions result among the sphere from basing the 
contingencies in the spheres or contradictions in place of 
tautologies. Since contradictions are also necessary re-
lations. 
Man t u: In the relation of inclusive or we find the re-
lation not A or A when transposed by implication beco mes 
Olf A, then A which is a tautolo gy . Which is necessarily 
true. What would be the problem in the inclusive or 
relation here? 
Ni sha : It could seem to me that when one tried to base 
a contin gency relation on this tautology they they have 
overlooked the possibility that unde r the inclusive or 
relation if not A and A were both true it still would be 
true. But this is a contradiction and is clearly false under 
the relation absolutely. 
Man tu: Could we say then my friend that one has turned 
an inclusive or relation into a tautology when in fact it 
should have been turned into a contradiction namely A and 
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not A. There seems to be a problem with using the inclusive 
-
or relation when dealing with only one term. Would you say 
the problem is here or in another place? 
Nisha: I would say that the problem seems to result from 
thinking that ·a contradiction could be true absolutely and 
thus not sensing that any variable can only have one in-
terpretation at any given time. Thus having a case where 
A and Not A are both true at the same time would seem im-
possible. 
Mantu: Could we say that relativity must be over time 
and not at any given time. 
Nisha: We could. It would also appear my friend that 
all relativity could be based upon this misapplication of 
basing contin ge ncy or necessary contradictions that appear 
to be tautolo gies. 
Mantu : Would it follow from this that relativity and 
contradiction between the spheres is impossible unless 
contradictions are necessarily true? 
Nisha: I t would my friend. But clearly there are relative 
spheres and conflicts between the spheres. 
Mantu: It appears only that there are relative spheres. 
If the law of non contradiction is true there can be no re-
lative truth at any given time. All that appears to be 
relative would be based on false premises. 5ut if the law 
of non contradiction was not a necessary relation and in 
fact false, relative truths would be possible of any given 
time and in effect all things would be possible . Do you 
understand what I mean by all things would be possible? 
Nisha: You mean that if there were no absolute truths 
all thin gs would be relative and all things could be true 
and possible and that which is possible could only be that 
which is actual. 
Mantu: You understand me comple tely . May I say as well 
that the impression that relative truths exist at any 
given time is based upon faulty comprehension of the 
absolute truth and mans misinterpretation of the states 
of affairs. This is also a type of false premise based 
notion or imperfect conceptualization of notions. 
Nis ha: But Mantu can not relative be used to denote 
an absolute truth in part also? 
Mantu: Yes it may and in this sense relative truths and 
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relative knowledge is a subset of absolute truth and knowledge 
not its opposite. But the relative used in this sense would 
in effect be a smaller sample of the absolute and be a smaller 
body or sphere of absolute truth. Relative used in this 
manner I take to be a faulty use of the word. 
Nisha: Would it not be the case that on the condition that 
either all things are absolute or all things are relative 
at any given time, in the exclusive sense, that it would 
follow that there is only one sphere of truth and not many 
independent spheres; assuming of course that all things are 
absolute. 
Mantu: That it would. 
Nisha: Would it not also be true that if all things are 
relative there would be as many spheres of truth as there 
are truths? 
Mantu: That it would also. 
Nisha: Absolutes would give rise to a fixed and rigid 
description of things but relatives over time would give 
rise to a mechanistic or causal description of things. 
Relativism may give rise to a teleological explanation 
of things. 
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Man tu: Very good Nisha. I agree fully with your observa-
tion. Absolutism implies how things are but relativism may 
deal also with why things are. Absolutism also gives rise 
to having fixed "values" where relativism does not. But 
Ni sha my friend we have come to the conclusion that either all 
things are absolutely true or all thin gs are relative but 
what have we base d this conclusion upon? 
Nisha: I don't understand what you mean Mantu? 
Mantu: When I asked you what gives the contingencies 
in their spheres their truth values? 11What did you answer?tt 
Nis ha : I understand you now our division of knowledge 
into t he two extreme possibilities - all absolute or all 
relative in the exclusive sense is based upon the assumption 
that deduction is the process by which the truth values 
of the contin gencies contained therein may be derived due 
to the premisis given. 
Mantu: This assu.rnption, Nisha, has lead us to conclude 
these thin gs certainly. By what other method can we use 
to derived the truth of things besides deduction? 
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Nisha: Induction. 
Mantu : Right, could there be any other method to derived 
the states of affairs besides deduction or induction? 
Nisha: I think not. 
Mantu: What about a priori and.§: po s teriori distinctions? 
Nisha: I would say they are predicates describing aspects 
of the method but are not the method themselves. 
Man tu: 
Nisha: 
What about synthetic and analytic distinctions? 
I would say they describe the propositional form 
and structure of our observations 01' the states of affairs 
but do not describe the method by which we access how states 
of affairs are. The relationships between states of affairs 
constitutes truth or facts and our awareness of this consti-
tutes knowledge. 
Mantu: I agree with your observations my friend we must 
return later and discuss these distinctions but first we 
must conclude our discussion on induction and deduction. 
Would induction used as the process of deriving the truth 
of things change any of our conclusions we reached about 
either things are absolute or they are relative but not 
both? 
Nisha: It would not. But we must realize that if we use 
induction as the method for ascertaining the truth of things 
to give us knowledge. That induction is based upon a belief 
that things are absolute and truth is constant. Induction 
becomes useless as a method of ascertaining truth unless 
things are uniform in all spheres and subsets of truth and 
understanding. 
Man tu: It would seem if we are to understand anything 
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about the states of affairs in a "valuable" way over time 
there must be some absolutes underlying the relative nature 
of contingency over time and they must be universal and 
fixed in nature. .l!'urthermore all causality and contingency 
must come to some point of necessary tautologous states 
of affairs upon which all subsequent things would be depend-
ent. Relatively must proceed in an orderly manner. 
Nisha: I a gree Mantu my friend . If thing were relative 
the y would not say anything without some type 01· ordering 
of them. There could be no real "value" in tryin g to access 
how thin gs were and are and how they are related in time. 
Time would become just one thin g after another with no 
necessar y relationships between events. All things would 
become functional no t valua ble. If man were free it would 
not make any difference in a relative world void of underlyin g 
absolutes bec ause acts would have no connections with any 
type of consequence. There could be no freedom in thi s 
situation becau se there is no responsibility and you can not 
make sense of freedom without responsibility. Where there 
is no cons tanc y or cau sa l connec tions knowledge of anything 
but mans absurdity becomes impossible. No real "valuable" 
knowledge woul d be possible. Sci ence, -Ethics, History, 
Arts, Psychology, and civilization in general would be 
futile. All "so-called" civilization would be one big 
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accident cr eated by chance events. When casualty is dropped 
from the picture even simple manufacture of a chair is a 
great miracle when there is no causal connection between 
shaping the materials a step at a time and the resultant pro-
duct a miracle has indeed taken place. Furthermore 
-----
Mantu: Nisha my friend excuse my butting in like this 
but now you've cau ght the vi sion you could go on forever 
unless I stopped you . I agree totally with your observations. 
In assuming ' that induction i s a method by which we may access 
the truth, facts and principles relating things we have 
assumed that absolutism is the way thin gs are in truth. It 
would be futile to continue our di scourse unless we at this 
point assume that relativism is wrong as the ulti mate base 
and absolutis~ i s i ts only alternative as the ultimate base 
and is righ t . Vie would have nothing further to discuss 
from this point on if we assumed the converse . It would 
make no sense to talk of things void of cau sal relationships 
and indeed all that could be sa id would be that "thin gs are", 
they contradict and are meaningless and in effect that life 
is abs urd. 
Nisha: I agree fully lets finish our discourse and when 
we arrive at its conclusion access if our assumption makes 
the truth of itself mani:est sufficiently that it will no 
lon ger be an assumption but a tautologous self manifesting 
absolu t e truth . Let us proce ed . 
Mantu : Let u s return now to questions of analytic and 
synthetic distinctions. What did we decide that they had 
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reference to? 
Nisha: We came to the conclusion that they are structural 
types or forms we give to our observations about the "states 
of affairs 11 and not that they were the method by which we 
access the current states of affairs. 
Mantu: How does the structure of a synthetic proposition 
differ from the structure of an analytic proposition? 
Nisha: Analytical propositions are biconditional in 
structure wher e as synthetic propositions conditional in 
structure. 
ffJantu: Let us discuss analytical propositions first and 
then we will return to discu ss synthetic propositions. What 
do you mean Nisha when you say analytic propositions are 
biconditional in structure? 
Nisha : I mean that they are definitional and the meaning 
is self-contain ed in the proposition and futhermore that 
they are always true and thi s is evidenced by their structure, 
content, and meaning alone. 
Man tu : Could you illustrate this with analytic proposition-
al examples for the sake of clarification, Nisha? 
Nisha: An example of an analytic proposition would be 
arithmetic equations for example 2+3 = 5 is an analytic 
proposition. It is definitional clearly 2+3 is equal to 5 
is of a definitional nature and the equation is self contained. 
The structure, content, and meaning by themselves-evidence 
clearly its tautologousness . The word 'biconditional' de-
notes al so that as well as 2+3 = 5 being true 5 = 2+3 is 
true. 
Mantu : Very good. Bu t can you give me an example of 
analytic propositions of other than an arithmetic nature? 
Nisha: 
nature. 
Lingui s tic definitions are also of an analytic 
.r'or example the proposition stating, "Men are the 
male of the human species and women are the female of the 
human species" is an analytical proposition. It is self 
evidencing , self contained, and tautologous. It is also 
clearly definitional and both side of - the conjunct are 
clearly biconditional in nature. 
Man tu: Would the statement, 11Pens are writin g utensils" 
in your estimation be analytical in nature? 
Nisha: 
~1an t u: 
I would think so. 
3ut Nisha, it is not bi conditional in nature, 
clearly pens are writin g u tensils , but writin g utensils 
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are not pens. Can it therefore be an analytical proposition, 
or is the criteri on that analytical proposition s must be 
biconditional mistaken? 
Nisha : I would think that analytical propositions need 
not be biconditional in nature and that when I said they 
were that I was mis taken. 
Mantu: How then, Nisha, can we distinguish between analytic-
al and synthetic propositions? For, if both are conditional 
in nature your first explantion of how they differ is not 
adequate to determine the difference between them. What I 
suggest that we do at this point is to examine some synthetic 
propositions and then return to this question. For clearly 
it appears that analytical propositions are conditional in 
nature and if synthetic propositions are also conditional 
in nature then we must return to distinguish as to whether 
they differ in how they are conditional or if they do not 
differ at all in this respect. Nisha, would you please 
tell me what you conceive synthetic propositions to be. 
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That we may get started in the comparison and contrast of the 
two propositional types. 
Nisha: It would seem to me Mantu, that synthetic proposi-
ti ons are propositions which are not self evidencin g , not 
se lf contained, not definitional, and they are contingent 
when they stand alon e . 
Mantu: Very goo d, my f r iend. Could you give me some 
ex ample s of synthetic propositi ons? 
Ni sh a: The pr opos ition "The gla s s contain s no liquid" is 
an example of a sy nt hetic proposition. It is not self evidencing 
in na t ure . One mus t look and see if indeed the glass is 
void of liquid t o assertain i ts truthfulness. It is contin-
gent when it stan ds alone upon whether there is indeed no 
liquid contained in it and its truth is conditional upon this. 
The f or m of the porposition alone is not enough to determine 
its truthfulness and clearly glasses are not by definition 
void of liquid. 
Man tu: Very good Nisha, my friend, could you give me an 
example of synthetic propositions in mathematics? 
Nisha: The proposition "line XY is 3 uni ts long" is a 
snythetic proposition. It is not self evidencing in nature, 
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clearly one must look at line XY to determine if it is 
indeed 3 units in length. It is contin gent and conditional 
on the fact that there is indeed such a line XY and that 
it is indeed units in length. The proposition itself can 
not stand alone and all such lines XY are not 3 units 
in length by definition. 
Mantu: Bravo; it seems to me that you have indeed clearly 
assertained the di1"ference between synthetic and analytic 
propositions thus far. But we still have to resolve the 
business about the Jiconditional or conditional aspects 
of analytic and synthetic propositions. Let us return to 
the proposition "Pens are writing utensils" and examine 
this analytical proposition more closely. Nisha, what do 
you see as the difference between the antecedan t and the 
consequent of this conditional that prevents it from 
being biconditional in nature? 
Nisha: It would seem to me Man tu that pens are only 
one of many writing utensils and that due to this the 
conditional equation only works in one direction. 
Mantu: How then could this problem be overcome? 
Nisha : I would think that by clarifying the consequent 
of the conditional by adding to it conjuncts we could 
determine the criteria that makes a pen different from 
other writing utencils. This would serve to make it bi-
conditional in nature. 
Mantu: What other crit eria could one conjoin to the criteria 
writing utensils to ma~e this proposition a biconditional? 
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Nisha: We could add the criterion that this writing 
utensil uses ink. This it seems would suffice to ma~e 
this conditional analytic proposition into a biconditional 
a~alytic proposition. 
Mantu: Would you now te ll me that there are conditional 
and biconditional structures for analytic propositions? 
Nisha: It would seem that there are. 
Mantu: The conditional type analytic proposition would 
seem to be a species-genus type conditional which does 
seem to fit all the criterion of the analytic propositional 
type . 
Nisha: That appear to be the case. 
Man tu: rhe biconditional analytic proposition would 
seem to be definitional in the strict sense where as the 
conditional analytic type propositions would seem to be 
a classificational definitional type of proposition . 
Nisha: That also appear to be the case. 
Mantu: What would seem to be the distinction, Nisha , in 
your estimation, between the conditional relation .in the 
anay l yt ic and synthetic proposition classifications. 
Nisha : It would seem to me Mantu my friend, that the 
relation between the antecedent and the consequent in the 
analytic propositions h ave a necessary truth relationship 
whereas the conditi onal relationship in the synthetic 
propositional form have a contingent truth relationship. 
Mant u: Very good Nisha, it would seem to me that another 
qualification one could place on analytic propositions is 
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that they are necessary and another criteria of synthetic 
propositions is that they would be contingent. Thus it 
would seem that we have adequately examined analytic and 
synthetic pr oposit ions in isolation. But Nisha my next 
question is could what we have just established as a 
criterion for isolated analytic and synthetic propositions, 
be applied also to groups of propositions and their structure 
as a whole? 
Nisha: I t would seem to me that it could. But what 
significance would this hold for us? 
Mantu : It would seem to me that the logical structu re of 
induction and deduction are related to this type of 
groupi ng and criterion. I think it would be ben ef icial for 
us to analyze this relationship and see to what extent this 
is true . First however we need to discuss.§: priori and~ 
£Osteriori distinctions. Nisha , what are the distinctions 
between a priori and~ poste riori refe~ences and what did 
we decide that they were. Were they the method by which 
we gain knowledge or did we decide they were predicates 
of it? 
Nisha: We decided that a uosteriori and.§: priori were pre-
dicates of the method and not the method itself. 
Mantu: What do we mean by~ priori; Nisha? 
Nisha : We mean literally "prior to" by.§: priori but it 
is used commonly to mean independent of experience. 
Man t u: What characteri sties are generally ascribed to 
~ priori knowled ge? 
Nisha: It is viewed as necessary and is associated with 
knowledge independent of physical experience. 
Mantu: What do we mean by_§: nosteriori; Nisha. 
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Nisha: We mean literally "posterior to" by.§: posteriori 
but it is used commonly to mean after experience. 
Mantu: What characteristics are generally ascribed to 
_§: posteriori knowledge? 
Nisha: It is viewed as contin gent and is associated with 
knowledge dependent upon physical expe r ience. 
Mantu: Can you give an exa~ple of.§: priori knowledge? 
Nisha : Knowin g before we experience it~that if we jump 
off the top of a buildin g that we will fall is an example 
of_§: priori knowledge. Another example would be knowing 
how a scientific experiment would turn out before we 
experience how it will turn out is another example of 
.§: priori knowledge. 
Man tu: Very good. Can you give me an example of a posteriori 
knowledge? 
Nisha: Knowing after we have jumped off a building that 
we would fall if we were to do it again is an example of 
.§: posteriori knowledge. Anot her example would be knowledge 
based on the results of scientific experimentation. 
Mantu : It might also be contended that~ priori knowledge 
is not informative because it is necessary nature and 
trivial quality and that a posteriori knowledge is informa-
tive because of its contingent nature and non-trivial quality. 
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Do you think this is viable? 
Nisha : Yes in regard to cause and effect provisions what 
one has experienced is surely more informative and non-tri-
vial to him than what one has not. 
Mantu: Let us return now Nisha, my friend, and discuss 
the analytical and synthetical proposition groups or 
chains and their relationship to deduction and induction. 
Nisha, what do you see that a group of propositions would 
be like that are analytic on the whole. Let us call this 
group for reference's sake analytic propositional chains. 
Nisha: Man tu it would seem to me that a group of pro-
positions composing an analytic propositional chain would 
have the same criteria or characteristics as an individual 
analytic proposition. 
Mantu: For reviews sal.ce what were those criteria, Nisha? 
Nisha: The criteria for an individual analytic proposi-
tion which would also apply to analytic propositional chains 
as a whole are: Firstly that they would be necessary in 
character as a whole, second that they would be definitional 
in character, thirdly that they are always true and are 
self contained in content and str ucture, and fourthly 
that the truth value of the conclusion is evidenced due to 
structures fo llowin g from the premises given. 
Mantu : Would we need to add any other criterion to these 
four due to our subject now bein g propositional analytical 
chains instead of analytic propositions in isolation? 
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Nisha : 
of form. 
Mantu : 
I think we would due to the increasing complexity 
criteria? 
Nisha: 
What do you think we would need to add as a new 
I think we would need to add the criteria that 
all of the propositions within the chain must be used in 
coming to a conclusion based on the chain as a whole. 
And also that if there be any contingent synthetic pro-
positions within the chain that they would need to be ful-
filled as to be part of the necessary inference of the 
chain on the whole. 
Man tu: Is this assembling of analytic propositions of 
an arbitrary nature? 
Nisha: No it is not; the assembling of any chain reflects 
a sphere of truth and as such can not be arbitrary but must 
be orderly and the component s of it must be interrelated. 
Mantu: I agree with you fully. What criterion do you 
think would be necessary if we were to compose a synthetic 
propositiona l chain in the same manner as we have composed 
the above analytic propositional chain? Do you think such 
a formalation would be possi ble ? 
Nisha: · I would think the criteria for an individual 
synthetic proposition would be the sa me as for a synthetic 
propositional chain except adapted on the whole and I do 
think such a formation possible . 
Mantu : 3y way of review what are those criterion? 
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Nisha: The criterion are firstly that they would be non 
definitional in nature, Secondly that they would be contin-
gent in character as a whole, thirdly that their truth 
values are contingent and conditional and are not self 
contained in the form and structure, and fourthly that 
they are not self evidencing truths as a whole. 
Man tu: Would we need to add any new criterion to these 
four due to our subject now being synthetic propositional 
chains instead of synthetic propositons in isolation? 
Nisha: I would think that this would again be necessary 
due to the increasin g co~plexity of form and structure in 
the chains. 
Mantu: What do you think that we would need to add as 
the new cri ter ion? 
Nisha : I would think that we should add the following 
criteria . F irstly that there must be at least one proposi-
tion in the chain that is still contingent. Secondly 
any conclusion would be based on the chain as a whole and 
that the soundness of the inference would still be tentative 
and subject to change due to the contingency factor, thirdly 
and lastly that the chain would use all the available in-
dividual propositions both synthetic and analytic that 
nertain to it to reach a conclusion. 
Mantu: D0 you think this last criterion should be added 
to the criteria also for analytic prepositional chains? 
Nisha: ~hat I do. 
r-'ian tu: Very good I agree with your observations fully. 
Has anything fa~iliar struck you as rather odd about the 
propositional chains? 
:Usha : Not really what do you mean by odd? 
Man tu: I mean that they correspond with the induction 
and deduction methods and process? 
Nisha: In what way do you see this correspondence? 
Mantu: Do you remember that before our discussion on a 
priori and g posteriori distinctions that I brought up 
this same point that there seemed to be a relation and 
we would later discuss this? 
Nisha: Yes, I do remember this but I quite haven't made 
the connection yet will you please tell me what you see 
that I may become enlightened in this matter? 
Mantu: Analytical propositional chains are equivalent 
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to deducti on a nd synthetic propositional chains are equiva-
lent to induction. Does this connection clarify that 
analytic and synthetic distinctions were predicates describ-
ing th e method by which we gain knowled ge namely induction 
and deduction and not the method itself as we previously 
agreed Nisha? 
Nisha: Yes it does . 
~~antu: Would it seem likely that all of our knowled ge 
could be divided into four groups based upon the c ombination 
of analytic and synthetic di stinc tions and propositional 
chains with§ priori and a posteriori. The four types of 
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knowlege namely being synthetic~ priori, analytic a priori, 
synthetic~ posteriori, and analytic~ posteriori? 
Nisha: It would seem this division could be possible, 
but would not some nroblems be created by these divisions 
if our definitions are correct. 
Mant u: What type of problems do you see arising from 
these groupings? 
Nisha : Did n o t we define the predicate~ priori as having 
n ecess ity as one of its char acter istics and contingency as 
being a characteristic of the synthetic structure? 
Mantu : Yes we did. 
Nisha : It would seem we have a contradiction here then. 
Furthermore, did not we define the predica te ~ posteriori 
as having contin gency as one of its characteristics, and 
necessity as being a characteristic of the analytic structure? 
Mantu : Yes we did. 
Nisha: It would seem that we have a contradiction here 
also would it not? 
Mantu : It woul d seem such; what do you suggest we do then? 
Clearly ei th er our definitions are wrong or the seeming 
problem could be removed by making some kind of perspective 
distinctions. 
Nisha: I think it would be wise to investigate these types 
of knowledge and see if the problem could be solved due to 
perspective before we conclude that our definitions are 
wron g . 
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Mantu: I agree with you. Let us proceed in the follow-
ing order of discussion: first, synthetic~ priori, second 
analytic~ priori, third, synthetic~ posteriori, and 
fourth analytic~ posteriori. What constitutes synthetic 
a Priori knowledge? 
Nisha: Synthetic~ priori knowledge is literally knowledge 
before the fact through the syn the tic method. This would 
mean synthetic~ priori knowledge is somewhat of an observa-
tional or inductive character. Hence it must come from some 
kind of experience however because it is a priori it must 
be independent of experience. 
Mantu: It seems we have another contradiction regarding 
synthetic a ~riori knowledge. What types of things consti-
tute this type of knowledge? It seems that describing its 
characteristics keeps pointing towards a contradiction. What 
has traditionally been seen as knowledge of this type? 
Nisha: Immanuel Kant the formulator of this idea believed 
that our innate knowledge of space, time, and value constitute 
synthetic~ priori knowledge. 
Man tu: How could these innate impressions be c ontradictory 
in the manner we have discussed or are the contradictions 
only an illusion due to lack of separation by perspective? 
Nisha : It would seem that these three innate impr essio ns 
are necessary in that all other concepts seem to be contingent 
upon them and they would seem to be contingent up on our 
sensory experience. 
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Man tu: What do you mean by saying that all other concepts 
are contingent on them? 
Nisha: Only that they are the most basic type of kno wledge 
and without them all other types of knowledge would be im-
possible. 
Mantu: Could one say that having this type of knowledge 
is the most basic type of awareness of facts, truth and 
principles? 
Nisha: I think one could. 
Mantu: Would it be possible to generate all other types 
of knowledge from these three things alone or would more 
t~in gs be necessary to have another type of knowledge? 
Nisha: It would seem from time and space considerations 
that the conceuts which underl i ne mathematics both arithmetical 
and geometerical could be gen erated. 
Man t u: How so? 
Nisha : The concepts of time and space could give rise to 
the concept of number, equality, existence, conjunction, 
and their oppo s ites could be derived. 
Man tu: How could these be derived? 
Nisha: Through a process of exclusive disjunction or a divi-
sion of time a duality could be arrived at namely past and 
present. From this the concept of 11two 11 arises. From 
this the concept of "number" comparison yields the concept 
of 11equality 11 , by comparing all-time with past and present 
a type of contrast arises. 
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Man tu: Would not the concept of "conjunction" necessarily 
arise before the concept of "equality" could? 
Nisha: It would seem that the concept of 11conjunction 11 must 
arise as early as the concept of "division" because they 
are opposites. 
Man tu: We have failed to account for the fact that opposites 
could not arise without a concept of "negation". Where would 
this arise? It would seem that the concept of "ne gat ion 11 
could not arise from space and time alone nor from division 
alone. Division must have preceeded conjunction. Because 
one cannot conjoin anything if there only exists the con-
cept of 11one 11 namely all that is. 
Nisha: 
concept. 
It would s ee m that "n egat ion" arose second in 
It was preceded only by the concept of "exis tence" 
which is derived from space and time notions themselves. 
Man tu : What order would one give to the concepts as they 
arise then in way of review? 
Nisha: It would seem that a concept of "existence" must 
arise first, second a concept of 11negatio n, 11 thirdly a 
concept of "disj unction", fourthly a concept of "nu mber ", 
fifthly a concept of "conjunction", and sixthly a concept 
of "equality". 
Man tu: This sti ll seems arbitrary to me. It would it seems 
better to say that the concepts of "negation", "conjunction", 
11di s juncti on 11 , and "equali ty 11 are inseparable and arise at 
once being only preceded by a concept of "existence" which 
is inherent in the concepts of 11space 11 and 11time 11 itself. 
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However Nisha during this discussion we have failed to bring 
the concept of "value" into play here Kant thoughts concept 
of "moral imperative" was synthetic.§: priori also, we have 
termed it value here. Could this explain any of thing about 
the arising of these things whic~ we have after a concept 
of "existence"? 
Nisha: It would seem in this concept of "value" is inherent 
a duality in-itself. It would seem that all these thing we 
have said arise from the synthetic.§: nriori triune of space, 
time, and value are inherent in the concepts themselves. 
Mantu: The only concept named which does not seem apparent 
in the synthetic.§: priori triune is the concept of "multipli-
city" or "plurality'' or concept of "number" beyond "two". 
How could this be explained? 
Nisha: Suppo se , Man tu , that we are aware that we have 
these three types of impressions would not the concept of 
"multiplicity" be inherent itself in -the synthetic.§: priori 
triune and all things inheren t ly inclusive within it? 
Mantu : That it would. It would seem Nisha, that all 
mathematics can be built from the concepts inherent in the 
synthetic.§: priori triune. But what about language how 
could it arise. 
Nisha : I don't quite under stand what you mean. Could you 
exnand on your question? 
Man tu: What concepts seem to unde1;lie language itself? 
Nisha: 'rhe concepts of "lo gic " seem to underlie the struc-
tural concept of language. 
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Mantu: What are these underlying concepts? 
Nisha: 11Conjunction 11 , "disjunction", and ''negation", seem 
to be the major concepts of logic and all other concepts 
are expansions upon these. 
Mantu: In mathematics the same terms have been renamed 
the addition, the subtraction, and the inverse functions 
have they not. 
Nisha: That they have. 
Man tu: Multiplication and division are more complex forms 
of these as complex grarnmitical structures are more complex 
forms of the linguistic foundation it would seem. Nisha, 
is all our knowledge ultimately based on language definitions 
and mathematic axiom or theoms? 
Nisha : It would seem so. ~antu , would not this show that 
kn owledge is indeed an awareness of facts, truths and princi-
ples if this is true? 
Mantu: It would seem so ultimately. Are not all facts, 
truths, and principles a elaboration of the synthetic 
~ priori triune in simplicity or complexity ? 
Nisha : It would seem such. 
~antu: Have we not over looked one concept that must arise 
if a de gr ee of complexity is to be achieved? 
Nisha: I don't quite understand what you mean. Which con-
cept do you have in mind? 
Mantu : It would seem to me Nisha, that any degree of 
complexity must require some type of ordering and grouping. 
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Can you see anywa y how these concepts could arise from the 
synthetic g priori triune? 
Nisha : It would seem that these concepts are inherent in 
the concept of "value" itself. The grouping must be done 
or ordering of some sort must ensue due to a sense of 
value. , 
Mantu: I would agree with you full in this point. Kant 
believed that the 11categorical imperative" of morality 
was synthetic a nriori - however we have termed this "value" 
which is far more inclusive. Why do you think that we 
have chosen this t erm? 
Nisha : It would seem that this term includes moral value 
as well as truth value connotations and is a more effective 
expression to use as such. It grounds our ethical theory 
as well as out truth theory. 
Man tu: We have discussed how the synthetic.§: priori triune is 
necessary and independent of experience due to its a nriori 
nature thus far but what about its synthetic character we 
said all of it is contingent on sensory information and its 
accuracy. Could you explain why we must link it to sensory 
experience in this manner? 
Nisha : It would seem that our sense impressions of space, 
time, and value can be deceptive in some ways and that when 
the~ are right the knowledge that follows from such must 
also be necessarily right. But when they ar e wrong our 
knowledge must be wrong in part and its truth becomes contin-
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gent on our impressions as such. 
Mantu: It appears seming our contradiction problems have 
been removed here due to perspective in regards to synthetic 
~ priori knowledge. 
Nisha: It seems, Mantu, that our base of knowledge is only 
as clear as our sense perceptions are. It would seem our 
five senses convey to us all knowledge also and that through 
them we have our awareness of truths, facts, and principles. 
Mantu: Let's discuss each of the synthetic.§: priori triune 
more closely and their implications. First let's start with 
time. Do you think that carefully loo king at what happens 
in time we could understand better absolutism and relativity? 
Nisha : In what way do you mean? 
Man tu: Could one consider ti me one of the necessities 
which underlie the spheres of truth and understanding? 
Nis h a: I think one could. 
Mantu: Did we not decide that all truth must be of an 
absolute nature due to t9e fact th a t all truth results from 
the necessar y ta utolo gies that underlie the sphe re s of 
understanding? I f so what would seem to follow from this? 
Nisha: We did, and it seem to follow that at any time 
11Tn all truth is absolute and of the saJne sphere. This would 
be due t o the fact that a tim e perspective is associated 
with all of our knowledge. 
Man tu: What would seem to be i mplied about relativity if 
this notion is correct? 
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Nisha: It would seem that relativity deals with comparison 
of the facts, truth, and principles of different times. 
Mantu: 3ut what is happening in the present sphere logic-
ally has nothing to do with the occurences in past or 
future spheres it would seem. 
Nisha: If that is true, contradictions between spheres 
could not occur because two spheres could not exist at 
the same time. It would seem that relativity could only 
happen between two times and consequently contradictions 
could appear only over two separate times. 
Mantu: Would you think that contradictions were impossible 
in a state where time is sequential? 
Nisha : It would seem such. However it would seem that 
the law of contradiction would not necessarily hold in 
a state where time was not sequential. 
Man tu: Is there any such state? 
Nisha: I have heard it theorized that in the fourth 
dimension all time is present at once. It would seem that 
contradictions that are made imp ossible by the sequential 
nature of time would be po ssible and true in such a state 
and all things would be true consequently there. 
Mantu: In the third dimension we talk of actualit y anJ 
possibility but do you thing any such distinction would 
be applicable in the fourth dimension? 
Nisha : I would think not. In the fourth dimension it 
would seem that all possibility would be equal to all actuality. 
Mantu: It would seem we have found such a state that 
we discussed in the earlier portions of our conversation 
where in all possible things are true. 
Nisha: 3ut we exist in a third dimensional state so 
let us leave this and go back to our discussion on 
third dimensional time. 
Mantu: We decided did we not that absolutions is due to 
the fact that we live in the present in other dimensional 
world and as a result there exists only one sphere of 
truth, in actuality. Clearly possibility makes what 
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would happen in the future and is 11actualized 11 to some extent 
in the past. But we only have hones of the future and memories 
of the past both existing in the present. Could one say 
that they are part of our present then? 
Nisha: I would think not, but clearly they affect the way 
we perceive the present and the way which we may act on 
our present perceptions. 
l½antu: I would agree with you. Let us leave this and 
discuss the secon part of our synthetic~ priori triune 
namely space: Does our concept of "space" have any implica-
tions for the law of contradiction. 
Nisha: It would seem that two different physical things 
can never occupy the sa~e space at the sa~e time. Therefore 
we must conclude that it is impossible for something to 
be liquid and solid everywhere at the same time. 
Mantu: It would seem that the law of contradiction here 
is still based upon the sequential time motion in the third 
dimension. It would seem that a concep t of "space" by 
itself is not enough to create a noti on of the law of 
contradiction. 
35 
Nisha: It appears that our concept of "space 11 gives rise 
to a material notion of the world and our concept of time 
gives rise to order and absolutism. 
Mantu: What could our synthetic_§: priori concept of 
value give rise t o? 
Nisha : It would seem that it gives us a concept of ord er. 
Within this concept levels, ranks, and groups appear. 'I1his 
wor ld is of an ab so lute nature at any give n moment and is 
t eleo logical. 
Mantu: Very good I think we've said enough about the mem-
bers of our synthetic.§: priori triune for the present. I 
perceive a problem in th e notion that this triune gener ates 
all oth er things throug h. 
Nisha: What is that Ma.'1tu? 
Man tu: It would seem to me that this triune could only 
give rise to s tructural for:-ns. It would seem that something 
is lackin g here. What do you suppose it to be? 
Nisha: It would seem that structures alone in mathematics 
coul~ not give meaning it would also seem that they could 
not in langua ge either. 
Mantu: What then is missin g , do you think? 
Nisha : It would seem that the i dea of concept formation 
or naming i s missing. 
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Mantu: Do you think it possible for even structural concepts 
to arise without a process of naming? 
Nisha: I would think not, it would seem that no concept 
could exist without some type of word or conceptualization 
of it, through some sort of 'symbol' for i t . It would also 
seem that words, numeric symbols, and relationship symbols 
stand for the concepts named and that each meaningful 
expression of these has some sort of concept for which it 
stands. 
Mantu: When sentences are generated would one need to 
assemble these meaningful symbol s for concepts in a 
proper way for the ~ntence to have meanin g on the whole? 
Nisha: I would think so. Would then it be possible 
to say that these sen te nces have a synergetic value of 
so rts? 
Man tu: What do you mean by synergetic? 
Nisha: Only that the meaning of the whole is greater than 
the meanings of the sum total of the parts. Do you thin.~ 
that sentences have synergetic value then? 
Mantu: I would think so. It would seem that before the 
concepts inherent in the synthetic~ prioi triune could 
arise that we must have a process of concept labeling 
through words. Would the statement that in the beginning 
was the word and from it comes all things that pertain to 
knowledge be true? 
Nisha: I think it would. But what of the numerical and 
relationship symbols we spoke of are they also from the 
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word? 
r.-:an tu: It would seem that these symbols stand for things 
that can also expressed by words and see~ to be a type of 
short hand for their linguistic equivalents which preceeded 
them. It would also seem that the concept and the word 
which express it are inseparable. 
Nisha: But how could this be must not these be a concept 
to name before one can assign a word to it to na~e it? 
Mantu : It would seem not but one could not have a concept 
unless there was also a word to express it. It would seem 
also that unless a concept is n~~ed to distinguish it 
from all others that we can not tell it from all others 
and how then can we have the concept? 
Nisha: It would still seem to me that we may have the 
concept without a word to express it and that we may see 
words which we do not understand the concept for which 
they stand. 
T-Iantu: ~his would only be applicable to language used 
in discourse between two people . 
Nisha : What do you mean 1J:v the word "this" in you ref erec e' 
Mantu : I mean the case in which we see a word but do 
not understand the concep t that it symbolizes. 
Nisha : Would it be right to say we see a word in reference 
to discurse between two persons? 
Mantu: ~fo it would no t . I meant we hear a word in discour 
between ourself and one or more others. But in the ev~nt of 
readin g one could say he sees a word and the he does not 
under stand the concept that it symbolizes. 
Nisha : It would seem to me that this would have more to 
38 
do with learning an existing language rather than generat ing 
a new one. Would you agree? 
T1'.an tu: Yes I would. The other case in which it would 
be possible to have a concept before we have a word to 
express it, would seem to have to do with generating a 
language, or new words in a lan guage , or even not knowing 
the already extent word to express our conc ept . Would 
you a gree? 
Nisha: I would. But Mantu, it seems like we have a 
probl em. It now seems that we have concluded that the 
'word' is the gen erator of all things knowable, but · did 
we not c onclude befo re that the synthetic~ nriori triune 
was the generator of all thin gs ? Would it be correct to 
say the concept of naming is either inherent in the synthetic 
a nriori triune somehow or else the very concep ts of the 
triune were generated by the word exclusively? 
Mantu: It would seem that indeed one of the two must be 
the case, but which is a good question. In generating a 
new language we have concluded that the concept appears 
before the word but in learning a language the word could 
appear before the concept. 
Nisha : I would disagree with you. It would s eem that in 
the early stage of learnin g an already extant language 
that one must have a concept before one could discern 
which word stood for it. Clear ly also if later one heard 
a word unfamiliar to him or saw such a word in print un-
less he understood the concept for which it applied in 
some wordless sense he could no t understand what the 
word meant. From this it would seem that concept always 
precedes word. It would seem that the synthetic~ priori 
triune preceeded the word or that the concept of namin g 
is somehow inherent in it. 
Man tu : It would seem that we could perceive of things 
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and have concepts without a process of naming. rhe process 
of naming seems to be related to interaction with others 
where we need a common symbol to express our concep ts . 
Is there any sense to this claim? 
Nisha: It would seem that we could not even logically 
reason in our mind without a type of language or symbol 
for our concepts. It would seem our concepts withou t some 
process of naming could never rise above raw perception. 
We would perceive of the existence of things but could 
say nothing of them. ~he concepts all would deal wi th 
physical perceptual concep ts . It would also seem that 
abstract concepts would be impossible for a person to have 
in isolation, unless he invented some type of symbolism 
to reason on the concepts in his mind. Concepts such as 
"ne gati on", 11 conjunction", and 11di sjunction 11 would be im-
possible as such without some process of naming. 
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~~antu: It would seem from this that the concents are 
said were in herent in synthetic a nriori triune would be 
i mpossible without a process of n~~ing. It would seem that 
if this is so the process of naming is also inherent in the 
synthetic ~ priori t riune . Would you agree with this? 
Nisha : I would. 
Man tu: What member of the triune would this be inherent in 
or would it be inherent in more than one member? 
Nisha: It would seem that the concept of naming would 
become necessary due to the law of contradiction which 
stems from the nature of time . The law of contradiction 
would create groups or spheres and na ming must follow. 
Mant u: But Nisha would not the law of con tradiction in 
itself necessita te tha t a process of namin g be prior to 
it to crea te an abstract concept of ne gat ion which without 
which the law of contradiction could not be formed? 
Nisha : It would seem such. Could then the process of naming 
be inhe re nt to the synthetic~ priori concept of 11value 11? 
Man tu : It would seem that the concept of value is of a 
dual nature in itself which entails a concep t of ne gat ion 
and therefore necessitates in its nature a process of 
na ming . 
Nisha : It would seem that all parts of langu age fromation 
na~ely, grammitical concepts, grouping, and naming (in-
cludin g concept and meaning which inh ere nt in its nature) 
are all inh ere nt in the synthetic~ priori triune by i ts 
very na ture . It would seem that all things spring from 
the triune and those things which are included in its 
nature, would you agree? 
~~antu: I would, and futhermore I think there are a 
few more things that must follow due to the inherent 
nature of the triune. Let us discuss them. 
4 1 
Nisha: What else do you see as following from the inherent 
nature of the triune? 
Mantu: Did not we say that there exists a duality in the 
concept of "value" in itself? 
Ni sha: That we did. 
Man t u: We a greed that it would be impossible to have 
two differin g concepts withou t some type of symbol or 'word' 
to differentiate between the~. It would seem to follow 
that we could not have our syn t hetic~ priori concept of 
valu e unles s it was prec e eded by some type of naming pro-
ces s to dif f eri entiate valu e typ es . Would you agree to th1s. 
Nisha: It would seem to follow, if what you have said 
i s true that because the nature of the triune involves 
three different part s that the symbols to differientiate 
thos e parts must exist also before we can have any idea 
of the concepts of the triune. But I think that you have 
overlooked the conclusion we reached that the concept and 
the word can not be separated one from another. Further-
more differentiation and concept formation are inseparable 
as well. It would also seem that my awareness of different 
concepts would be impossible without some type of naming 
process. 
Mantu: Prior to any naming process it would seem that 
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all awareness would be only of that which is,and that 
which is 9 is all that is. But we have termed our synthetic 
~ priori notions of space, time and value a triune. What 
is i~plied by this word? 
Nisha: The word triune implies that only one thing exists 
but that it has three faces. 
Mantu : Would the one seem to corre spond with the 'une' 
part of the wor d 'triun e ' and would the one be, that which 
i s? 
Nisha : It would seem that this would be th e case. 
Mantu : Could it be said that the 'un e ' or one 1 namely that 
which i s~precedes the 'word' or naming process? 
Nisha: 
r-~an tu: 
We could say that. 
It would al s o app ear that the ' ~ri' por tion of 
the word triune is not realised until after the 'word' 
or naming pr _ocess devides the 'une' or one into three parts. 
Nisha : It would seem that the 'un e ', being that which 
is, is na ~e less when it existe d before the 'word' and is 
n~~ed only after it becomes 'tri' after the 'word' differient-
ates it. Thus we sense the triune after the 'word'. 
Man tu: nut the triune exists before the 'word'; unsensed 
and undistinguished; as well as after, sensed and distinguish-
ed, it seems • . It would seem than without awareness of truths, 
principles, and facts which come through differentation 
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through the 'word' that there is no sensed personal existence 
only unsensed undistinguished existence of that which is. 
Nisha: Would it be right to say we have no sensed personal 
existence until we sense how we differ from that which is 
through the 'word'? 
Mantu: This would seem correct. It would also follow 
that we cannot sense existence of a personal good without 
the 'word' which is our process of naming and distinguish-
ing. 
Nisha: It would seem that concepts could differ from person 
to person - would this seem likely? 
Mantu: It would seem each person must be begotten through 
a type of awareness into the world of concept, through the 
'word'. It would also seem that a person could not learn 
a public language unless he first had a personal language 
of some sort to make some type of maping even if of a 
vague sort from one to the other. 
Nisha: Why would you say this? 
Mantu: If one cannot have a concept without some way to 
distinguish it namely by symbol or word - then one can not 
learn a public language without inventing some sort of 
personal language first, involving at least a similar 
concept. Would it seem that we have a personal language? 
Nisha: 
cede 
Cetainly a personal language of some sort must pre-
a public language. But it would seem that once we 
come to have a public language that we each discard our 
pe rso nal language - because its u s e is so li~ited. 
Mantu: Could we say then that a public language has 
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a far greater scope of usage than would a personal language? 
Nisha: That we could. But will you clarify what you mean 
by pe r sonal langua ge? 
Mantu: By personal language I mean a language one invents 
by oneself to achieve understanding about things around him 
which is sacrificed after one uses it as a tool to learn 
the al r eady extant pu blic language. Howeve~ if one could 
teach ones personal language to another we would have a new 
nublic lan gu age. 
Nisha: You mean by personal language a language only 
employeed by its inventor to give the world meaning. Might 
it be possible that new languages are invented when one 
makes his personal lan g uage into a public language instead 
of disgarding it when he learns an already e~tant public 
language. 
Mantu: That could be the possible basis for the different 
lan guage families already now extant. But this is purely 
speculation. It seems also that our notions of the triune 
is contin gent or our sense perceptions. We decided when our 
senses were not deceiving us that all our knowledge stemming 
from our conception or the synthetic~ priori triune must 
also be correct, but when our senses were deceiving us 
that the knowledge based upon this faulty conceution of 
the triune would be incorrect. In what way do you see that 
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our senses may deceive us in relation to our notions of 
space, time, and value? Give me an example of time deception 
first. 
Nisha : We may say that we may be deceived in our notions 
of time in two ways. Eith er time will appear t o have 
passed swiftly or slowly . We say that the tim e sure has 
pass ed swiftly usually when we have been involved quite 
extensively in what is tak in g place and are sympathetic 
t oward s it or are enjoying it. We say "time sure is 
passing slowly usually when we are not involved in what is 
taking place around and are un sympat he tic to it or are not 
enjoying it. Our perception of time may differ from the 
amount of time tha t has take n place in actuality. 
Bantu : This see11s to be a psychological type of deception. 
Would you agree? 
Nisha: I would. 
Man tu: This deception see ms to be bas ed on a lack of 
awareness of the fact s , principles, and trut hs around us. 
It would appear - that deceptions in relation to time are not 
really "deception" in th e s trict se n se . But are awareness 
pro'::Jlems which are knowled ge p ro:) le:ns. We do not preceive 
what is the case becaus e we are no t aware of it. Would you 
ag ree with this notion? 
Nisha: I would. It seems that t:-ie pro "!Jle ms in ou r knowledge 
here is a p rob lem creat ed thro ugh lack of knowledge, or 
ignorance . Our un aware ness of actual time can be cor rected 
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by looking at actual ti~e elapsed. 
Man tu: Could you give me an example of how our sense or 
no t ion of space can be deceived? 
Nisha: Optical illusions dealing with illusions or space 
are one example of how our notion of space may be deceived. 
Mantu: It would seem that when actual knowldege of the 
space concept is seen through measurement that our lack 
of awareness or ignorance is removed and we are no longer 
deceived and our faulty knowledge based on the seeming 
contradiction is corrected. Thus faulty notions of space 
and time are both corrected in the same manner. What is 
an example of how our sense of value may be deceived? 
Nisha: Take for example the color red take the same color 
and put it against a dark background then put it against 
a light background. Along side the dark background it will 
appear less intense than when placed next to a light back-
ground. When placed longside the light background it will 
appear mo~e intence than when placed next to a light back-
ground. Surely this is an exa~ple of how our notion or 
sense of value may be deceived. Intensity judgements are 
surely not judgements of a snatial or temporal nature. They 
must deal with some type of valuative judgement. Would you 
agree with this? 
Mantu: I would. Do you see any way the deceptive nature 
may be removed from our concept of value, much like our 
notions of space and time can be separated from their natures? 
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Nisha: A subsequent measurement of actual intensity could 
show our i gnorance of it. The deceptive appearance causing 
our ignorance, once removed, would give rise to real know-
ledge of value. Other examples could be deceptive. The 
problems in these areas could be cleared up in much the 
same way by accurate measurements which would dispel our 
ignorance and make our knowledge sure. 
Mantu: Might we say that all knowledge of the synthetic 
£ priori triune comes through our five senses. Could our 
senses be deceived also here and if so could you give 
examples? 
Nisha: It would seem so. ?irst lets discuss how our 
sense of sight might be deceived. We have already di s cussed 
optical illusions - which deal with part of our sense of 
sight. We have al so discussed how these illusions may 
be removed. 
Man tu: What about our sense of touch may it be deceived 
in any manner? 
Nisha: An example of touch deception may be shown in the 
following way. First prepare three bowls of water one 
extremely hot, one warm, and one extremely cold. Second 
put you right hand in the hot bowl and your left hand in 
the cold bowl. Do this simultaneously. Third remove your 
hands and place them in the bowl of warm water simultaneously 
You will notice at this point that the hand that was in 
the hot water previously will appear to feel cooler in the 
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water than the hand that had been in the cold water. You 
will also notice that the hand that had been in the cold 
water will feel warmer that the hand that had been in the 
hot water. Thus the warm water will appear to be two 
different temperatures to you two hands. This is an illu-
sion of the sense of touch. 
Mantu: Could this problem be removed in the same way as 
the optical illusion problems. Namely by accurate measure-
ment to dispel ou r ignorance and give us the knowledge? 
Nisha: I thin..~ it could. 
Man tu: Could you gi ve me an example of how our sense 
of hearing may be deceived? 
Nisha: We may hear a voice in the distance that we 
mistake f or a friend s because it is obscured by other 
noi ses . 
Mantu: Would it seem that this could also be removed by 
getting more information by accurate measurement, giving 
us awareness and dispeling our ignorance creatin g true 
knowled ge ? 
Nisha: It would seem so. 
Mantu: Could you give an example of how our sense of 
taste can be deceived? 
Nisha: When one eats something sweet after something sour 
it appears more sweet than i f you ate the same thing immedi-
ately following other sweets. In actuality it is no more 
sweet in either situation. 
Mantu: How could this problem be removed? 
Nisha: It would seem that accurate measurement could 
dispel false appearance and thus give us true knowledge 
once again. 
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Mantu: Could you give an example of how our sense of smell 
could be deceived? 
Nisha: When our sense of smell is obscured by a cold 
it can be deceived in that it will not be as sensitive to 
the odors arounds us. At this time we may mistake one 
odor for another which we may normally not. 
Mantu: Do you think this false appearance could be removed 
once again by some type of more accurate measurement? 
Nisha: I would. 
Man tu: I think it would be interesting at this point to 
examine what implications the very structure of our language 
has for human freedom. What do you see in the question 
form's structure and meaning that might imply human freedom? 
Nisha: Certainly quest ions of the cl ass involving human 
choice in a response would seem to imply that we are free 
to choose our respon se . 
Mant u: Could you give me an example? 
Nisha: Certainly. It would make no sense to say such 
things as 11:;:)o you want a piece of cake?" if one could not 
answer affirmatively or negatively. The concepts of affirm-
ation and negation in this case imply choice and choice 
implies human freedom. It would seem that this class of 
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questions in our language imply that human freedom exists. 
Mantu: Would it be correct to say that if linguistic 
symbols mirror actual states of affairs and the abstract 
concepts represented therein represent actual relations 
or possible relations betwee n states of affairs that man 
must be necessarily rree in all things exceut not to be 
1·ree. 
Nisha: This would s eem to follow. 
Man tu: Let us move on away from the synthetic~ priori 
knowledge class and our triune to discuss the second group 
namely analytic~ priori knowledge type. Nisha, what do 
you see as the characteristics of this type of knowledge? 
Nisha: Individual propositions of an analytic type would 
fall here as well as analytic propositional chains. This 
knowledge would be deductive in nature, necessary, and 
based on reason alone. rhis type of knowledge is verifiable 
in the strict sense because of its deductive nature. It 
is of course based entirely on the synthetic a priori triune 
or knowledge type. 
Mantu : What types of things do you see falling into this 
classification? 
Nisha: It would seem that analytical proposition 01· a 
definitional type involvin g equivalence, or genus species 
type definition based on the concepts which ari se from the 
synthetic ~ priori triune are of this nature. 
Mantu: Does this involve lin gu istic as well as mathematic 
51 
analytic propositions. 
Nisha: It does. It involves propositions of arithmetic 
in its various systems as well as the geometric axioms of 
the di gger ent geometric systems. It also involves all 
analytic propositions of the arithmetic and geometry which 
directly t'ollow from this. It also involves the analytic 
propositions of the various systems of language which de-
fine the relations of the concepts and their limits as 
expressed in the word. These definitions being of a 
species genus type as well as an equivalence type. 
Man tu: Would you place words themselves in the analytic 
~ priori distinction? 
Nisha: No I would not. Propositions can only be of a 
sente nce like structure. Propositions involve words and 
their relationships or nu.~bers and their relationships. 
rhey can not be words or numbe rs or relators alone. These 
things are thing-in-themselves. Kant called all synthetic 
~ priori knowledge concepts by this name. Clearly words and 
the abstract concepts or non abstract concepts for which 
they stand are things-in-themselves and therefore synthetic 
~ priori in nature. 
Man tu: But Nisha did not we decide that the synthetic 
~ priori impressions were only three in number and a triune. 
Nisha: 
Man tu: 
Nisha: 
That we did. 
How then has the triune become so many thin gs ? 
We also agreed that all things were generated by 
the triune and inherent in its nature. These many things 
are therefore part of the three and 01· the one for that 
matter also it would seem. 
Man tu: I would agree with you . Clearly a word or a re-
lator or a number for that matter cannot be a proposition 
but must necessarily be a thing-in-itself. It would seem 
that rational combinations of the things-in-themselves in 
an analytic manner make up the class of analytic ~ priori 
propositions and propositional chains. Would you agree 
that this is the case? 
Nisha: I would. 
---
Man tu : It would seem that a person's analytic a priori 
propostion formulations would be limited by the extent 
to which a person's concepts 01' thing-in-themselves are 
formed. Does this seem logical? 
Ni sha: It does. 
Mantu: Could one form meaningful propositions o::t" an 
analytic nature without knowing the meaning of all the 
thin gs-in-themselves contained in the proposition? 
Nisha: I would think not. 
Man tu : Would it be right to say that all meaning1·u1 
analy t ic propositions are self evidencing in respect to 
their value? 
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Nisha : It would. But clearly the meaningful proposition 
is greater in meaning than the sum of its meaningful parts. 
Would it be true also that all analytic propositions have 
some synergetic value? 
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Man tu: Clearly this follows. It seems that our analytic 
~ priori propositions are based on the sum total of our 
world-view and that our world view is the sum total of 
our concepts of word, number and relators or things in 
themselves. However the sum total of our concepts namely 
our world view does se em also to have some synergetic value 
above the sum of its parts. Would you agree? 
Nisha: Yes I would. 
Man tu: At this point I think we should move on and discuss 
synthetic~ nosteriori knowledge. What are the characteristics 
of this type of knowledge? 
Nish a: We arrive at our synthetic~ posteriori knowledge 
throug h a process of induction. Hence syn th etic~ posteriori 
knowledge involves synthetic propositions and synthetic 
propositional chains. All propositions of a synthetic nature 
are~ posterio r i and thus dependent on experience. 
Mantu: 3ut if all synthetic propositions are~ posteriori 
how then can we be justified in claiming there is synthetic 
~ priori knowledge? 
Nisha: We said that synthetic~ priori knowledge involves 
knowledge of things-in-themselves. 1rhings in themselves alone 
can never be propositions in spite of the fact that they do 
have meanin g in themselves. It takes more than one thing-in-
itself to form a proposition. However sometimes a single 
thing-in-itself can be uttered as a proposition. 
Mantu : But how can that be possible ir no thing in itself 
alone can be a proposition? 
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Nisha: Due to context, other things-in-themselves are 
included in the connotations of the utterance of the single 
thing-in-itself. 
Man tu: W!'l.at can some of these things be that are implied 
by context? 
::-Ji sha: Cert ainly space, time, and value are thing-in-
themselves that are necessary in every context and implied 
in the utterance. Other things could be implied as well 
accordin g to the circumstances. If these things weren't 
implied no proposition would have been made. 
Mantu: 
meaning? 
Nisha: 
If there is no proposition made is there any 
Yes, the thing-in-itself has conceptual meaning 
that is unde rstood even out of a propositional con tex t. 
However it has no propositional meaning because it has no 
relation to other things-in-themselves. Remember proposi-
tions have a synergetic meaning above their components 
meaning in isolation as things-in-themselves. 
Man tu: I agree with your observations fully. What follows 
from the inductive nature of all synthetic propositions and 
propositional chains? 
Nisha: It would seem that all synthetic propositions 
are at best contingent as are synthetic propositional chains. 
All conclusions of a synthetic propositional nature are 
th erefo re at best tentative. Would it seem possible to 
justify by experience our analytic~ priori propositions? 
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Mantu: It would seem not. It would be also wise to 
note that this is what the whole scientific method for 
justification tries to do. Since the method is invalid 
deductively it seems that we could never be sure of anything 
that it claimed to be justi1.ied. All answers there1·ore are 
at best tentative in the justification process or science, 
Nisha, could we say the scientific method is somehow linked 
to the f'our types of' knowledge and that various parts 01" it 
correspond with them up to this point? 
Risha: It would seem possible, but what correspondence 
would you suggest? 
~'.antu: 01:>servation, the f irst step of the scientific 
method, se ems necessarily linked to synthetic§ priori 
knowledge imp re ssions. Observation, tells us nothing in 
i tse lf propositionaly until we c~eate propositions t o give 
it synergetic propositional meanin g , hence giving some 
semblance oforder to our world. These propositions we 
create to give our obser vations order are called hypothese's. 
Eypotheses formation corresponds wi th analytic~ priori 
xnowledge formation . The scientific terminology can be 
broadened to all fields when one realizes hypotheses corre-
Enond with a priori analytic knowledge. Nisha , could it 
t e said that these two types of knowledg e and t~e i r 
ecientific'moctel equivalen t s all deal with things independ-
ent of experience or prior to experience? 
1isha: Yes we co uld but this is entailed by the word a priori 
which is predicated or them. 
Mant u: Would it seem that experimental results an d our 
conclusions are always based on experience. 
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Nisha: It would. I still don't see where this is leading 
though. 
Man tu: We have said that when our hypothesis corresponds 
with a ~riori analytic propositions and when we try to 
ascertain their validity through experimentation our con-
clusions based on this method will be§ posterior. Would 
it seem that a case of experimental hypothesis affirmation 
or experimental hypothesis negation of our theory would be 
possible? 
Nisha: It would. 
Mantu: We have said that experimental hypothesis affirm-
ation is done through a met hod of induction and have since 
termed it all tentative in nature, because its form is 
deductively involved. To what does a case of experimental 
hypothesis negation or denial correspond? 
~isha: It would seem that experimental negation must be 
deductive in character. It is also§ posteriori in character 
and hence it must be part of the§ posteriori analytic 
knowledge group. 
Man tu : Would it be correct to say it is a part of the 
group or would it be more correct to say that this type 
of knowledge gained by experimental hypothesis nega t ion 
is equivalent to§ posteriori analytic knowledge? 
:Hsha: 
Man tu: 
I think it would be correct to say the latter. 
Does it seem cl ear now that the four types of 
knowledge co rrespond exactly with the four parts of the 
the scientific method? 
Nisha : It would seem such. 
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Man tu: Would you agree then that they do correspond in the 
manner described? 
Nisha : I woul d . 
Mantu: Now I think we had better move on and discuss 
analytic a posteriori knowledge . Nisha, we have assigned 
analytic a posteriori knowledge a correspondence with 
experimental hypothesis negation. But what can we list as 
its characteristics? 
Nisha : ~hat it is necessary and contingent, info~mative 
and non informative, and that it is dependent on experience 
and not dependent on experience . 
Man tu: But these appear to be contradictory. Can these 
seeming contradictions be reomoved by perspective distinctions 
as they were in our case of synthetic a priori knowledge? 
:Hsha: 
Man tu: 
Nisha: 
It would seem tha: they could. 
How so? 
Analytic~ uoste riori knowledge is in formati ve in 
that it tells us what is not the case. It is non-informa-
tive in that it does not tell us what is the case directly. 
It is dependent on our experiences of what is not the case. 
It is necessary because of it s analytic propositional 
structure . It is contin gent due to its a posteriori 
character. 
Man tu : What types of things would fall in this class of 
knowledge? 
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Nisha: Knowle dge gained through experimental hypothesis 
ne gation. It would also appear that indirect confirmation 
of a hypothesi s fal l s in this class of knowledge. 
Mantu : What do you mean by indirect confirmation of a 
hypothesis? 
Nisha: I mean something like Hempel's ~aven paradox. 
Where one confirms indirectly that all ravens are blac k 
by looking for non- black non-ravens. 
Man tu : This seems rather strange. Certainly it is logically 
valid, but does he give any other examples that would not 
seem so strange. 
Nisha: There is the case that one may indirectl y confirm 
that all sodium salts burn yellow by burning things other 
than sodium salts and seeing that they do not burn yellow. 
Certainly wi tho u t the process of indirect confirmation 
science would be impared greatly . However indirect con-
firmation goes on not only in science but in all other 
disciplines as well. 
Man tu: ':!:his type of knowledge is indeed important. 
Earlier we discussed the notion that the concept of value 
in our sy nth e tic~ priori triune gr ound s ou~ ethical theory. 
,Jo ul d we say that the scie nti fi c method could be applied to 
our ethical theory as well? 
Nisha: 
Man tu: 
Nisha: 
I would think it could. 
In what way do you suggest that we do this? 
It seems that we have concepts of moral value 
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namely goodness and badness as things in themselves. We then 
generate hypothesis about moral ~ehavior in the form of 
rules or moral definitions these it appear are analytic 
~ priori propositions. Sometimes , and in fa ct quite 
often, we try to verify these moral hypothesis by experiment-
ation. However experimental hypothesis afirmation is always 
done on inductive level and by doing what our rules say is 
right we can never prove to ourselves certainly, that they 
are right . We then try a process of indirect confirmation, 
or process of experimental hypothesis negation, that proves 
to our mind certainly through the deductive method that they 
are true. 
Mantu: It seems likely that there is a cost in verification 
by the indirect method. Do you sense what I mean? 
Nisha : No, could you give me an example that will clarify 
what you mean? 
Mantu: What would con stit ute an indirect confirmation 
proof for the moral hypothesis murder is wron g? 
Nisha: 
wron g. 
Man tu : 
Looking for things that aren't murder and aren't 
What would constitute an experimental hypothesis 
negation giving us new knowledge? 
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Nisha: A case where in murder is right. I still don't see 
what your getting at by saying there are costs in the method 
Mantu: Our analytic _§: posteriori comes to us at times by 
an indirect proof in the deductive process. Could you 
review the indirect method of conducting deduction for us? 
Nisha: ~he indirect method calls for assuming the conclu-
sion is false and then working with the conclusion and the 
premises until you find a contradiction from which you 
can logically infer that the conclusion was indeed wrong. 
Mantu: Very good. What would an assumption of the con-
clusion being false entail. 
Nisha: I don't und e rstand what you mean. Could you clarify 
thi s ? 
Man t u: I mean that it would entail synthesizing other 
premises that follow from it until we reach a contradiction 
with our given premises or other premises that have been 
generated from them. We must also set up tests to try to 
prove our negated conclusion correct. If this were not 
done it would mean that we were not taking our negation of 
it seriously. It would mean that if we did not take the 
negation seriously we could not generate things that would 
follow from the negated conclusion. This means we could 
never come ~p with a contradiction which would tell us 
the conclusion we were correct initially . Do you see any 
implications for this in regards to tests for our ethical 
theo r y? 
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Nisha: It would seem that the conclusion •murder is wrong'. 
when negated would become 'murder is not wrong'. To conduct 
a test o!' this we would kill someone, and in so doing arrive 
at a contradiction and prove to ourselves that indeed murder 
is wrong, indirectly. 
Mantu: What does this imply concerning the problem of the 
weakness of the will'? 
Nisha : It would. see:11 that one can never prove his ethical 
t heory i s true by having it hence the weakness of the will 
may be seen as an attempt to prove ones ethical theory is 
correct by violatin g its tenents. 
Mantu: It would seem that analytic§: priori knowledge 
by in di rect proof is very co st ly when applied to ethical 
conc ep ts or for that fact to ot her propositions which give 
our world meaning~ What would be the effect if everyon e 
were to try to prove the moral axi om 'murder is wrong' 
by the indirect method? 
Nish a: It would seem that one person must ultimately be 
kill ed before he could prove it, and in the end, there 
would only remain one pers on living after everyone else had 
at tempted the proof. ~his is indeed a rather costly proof. 
Man tu: 
Nisha : 
What implications does this have in regards to faith? 
It appears that we can never prove our ethical 
theory without violatin g its axioms, hence it appears also 
that in order to have certain knowledge it must involve 
suspended belief fo r s ome length of time, or perhaps even 
disbelief. It appears that the weakness of the will is an 
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abandonment of faith 1'or rational certainty and knowledge. 
Hence it also seems that certain knowledge is inferior to 
probable knowledge. It appears however that this is the 
cas e only~ QOsteriori. ! priori all knowledge is certain 
but is arbitrary in that our concepts are only certain 
because we regard them as such because of the way we define 
the m. This is due to our organization of our world. It 
bein g a synthesis of ou r perso nal language concepts with 
ou r public lan guage concepts. 
Man tu : Bu t Nisha, I thou gh we sa id one disgards his per-
so nal lan gu age when he learns the public language alread y 
extant. How can our world be a synthesis of the two? 
Ni sha : In learning the public langua ge our per so nal langua ge 
concepts are the basis on which we learn th e public language 
concepts. Thi s mappin g will di ffer from person to person. 
Man tu: 
Nish a: 
Man tu: 
To what mapping are you referring? 
The mapping of public terms on to personal terms. 
Yes, but if we a bandon our personal language after 
we learn the pu blic langua ge how would this mapping remain? 
~Tisha : Once we abandon the personal langua ge the concepts 
of it remain but in the public langua ge terms. Hence the 
same term in our public language differs slightly in meaning 
from person to person. ~his is due to the fact that no two 
people h ad the same personal lan guage . Hence their use 01 
the pu blic langua ge must di f fer. 
Man tu: You mean then that althou gh the personal lan gua ge 
is abandoned, a good dea l of its concepts carr y over into 
our use of the public language, and hence our world is a 
synthesis of the two. 
~Hsha: 
'.vlan tu: 
Yes, that is what I mean. 
It seems that we are nearing the end of our 
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discussion. Does knowledge as we have discussed it only 
apply to knowledge in the Platonic sense namely as free, 
justified belief or does it apply to all other uses of the 
word as well? 
Nis~a: Knowledge as we have discussed it applies to all 
uses of the word no t just the Platonic sense of the word. 
Mantu: Could you explain the other uses of the word to 
know and how they fit in to this four part scheme of know-
ledge? 
Nisha: When one says "I know X11 he may mean one or any 
of the foll owin g : 11:Jon' t challenge me about X", "I a'Tl 
absolutely certain of X11 , "I am familiar with X", 11I am 
aquainted with X11 , 11I recognize X11 , 111 can predict things 
about the behavi or of X11 , 111 know that X is the case", 111 
know how to do X11 , or "I knew X in t he "carnal" sense 11 • 
When one defines knowledge as an awareness of the fact s, 
truths or principles as we have all of these uses of the 
word are pro vided for in the definition . We have said 
what is the case for a person is what constitutes the 
facts, principles and truths in his world view. It sho uld 
be noted also that what is not the case can also be specified 
as facts, principles and truths in a person's world view. 
Since world views differ from one person to another what 
a uerson may claim to know will also likely differ. In 
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any case when a person claims he knows something he claims 
his is aware of the facts, truths, and principles relating 
to it. '::'hus he is saying, in effect: " I am certain of X, 
don't challenge me on it," "I'm familiar with it, am aquaint­
ed with it, I recognize it, and I know that it is the case." 
Mantu: It seems that these things can easily be seen to 
fit into the scheme ot ours; but you have not shown me how 
when one say "I know X" meaning that I can predict things 
about X's behavior. I know how to do X, or I knew X in the 
ca�nal sense fit into this scheme. 
Nisha: When we Bay we know something meaning we can 
predict things about its behavior we are simply doing an 
induction by innumeration based on our experiences and 
coming up with a conclusion about how X will behave the 
next time in similar circwnstance s. When says 11 I know 
.x. 11 meaning I know how to do X they in effect are saying 11 1 
know the principles governing activity X, hence I can perform 
it if I will." 
J'v!antu: �hat is good, but you have still not accounted 
for the use of "I know X" meaning I knew X in the carnal 
sense. Could you do so. 
Nisha: When one says "I knew X" meaning I knew X in the 
carnal sense they are in effect saying that it is the case 
.:. 
that they performed an activity of a 11carnal" sort with 
person X. Hence it is just a complex way of saying that 
somethin g is the case. We have already discussed how this 
use fits our de f inition. 
Mantu: It seems that we have finished our discussion on 
knowledge. Perhaps some time we will have to discuss the 
four classes of it more in depth. 
Nish a : I agre e . 
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